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Video Liveness for Citizen Journalism: Attacks and
Defenses
Mahmudur Rahman, Mozhgan Azimpourkivi, Umut Topkara, Bogdan Carbunar
Abstract—The impact of citizen journalism raises important
video integrity and credibility issues. In this article, we introduce
Vamos, the first user transparent video “liveness” verification
solution based on video motion, that accommodates the full
range of camera movements, and supports videos of arbitrary
length. Vamos uses the agreement between video motion and
camera movement to corroborate the video authenticity. Vamos
can be integrated into any mobile video capture application
without requiring special user training. We develop novel attacks
that target liveness verification solutions. The attacks leverage
both fully automated algorithms and trained human experts. We
introduce the concept of video motion categories to annotate
the camera and user motion characteristics of arbitrary videos.
We show that the performance of Vamos depends on the video
motion category. Even though Vamos uses motion as a basis
for verification, we observe a surprising and seemingly counter-
intuitive resilience against attacks performed on relatively “sta-
tionary” video chunks, which turn out to contain hard-to-imitate
involuntary movements. We show that overall the accuracy of
Vamos on the task of verifying whole length videos exceeds 93%
against the new attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The citizen journalism revolution, enabled by advances
in mobile and social technologies, transforms information
consumers into collectors and disseminators of news. Major
news outlets have started to fill out professional journalistic
gaps with videos shot on mobile devices. Examples range
from videos of conflicts in areas with limited professional
journalism representation (e.g., Syria, Ukraine) to sponta-
neous events (e.g., tsunamis, earthquakes, meteorite landings,
authority abuse). Such videos are often distributed through
sites such as CNN’s iReport [5], NBC’s Stringwire [9] and
CitizenTube [4].
The increasing popularity of citizen journalism is starting
however to raise important questions concerning the credibility
of impactful videos (see e.g., [3], [14], [41], [17]). The poten-
tial impact of such videos, coupled with the use of financial
incentives, can motivate workers to fabricate data. The media
abounds with examples of fraudulent videos and images [18],
[19], [20], [21], often captured at different locations than
claimed (see e.g., Figure 1).
Videos from other sources can be copied, projected and
recaptured, cut and stitched before being uploaded as genuine
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Fig. 1. On BBC: Video shot in Afghanistan claimed to be of the Germanwings
crash.
on social media sites. For instance, plagiarized videos with
fabricated location and time stamps can be created through
“projection” attacks: the attacker uses specialized apps [22],
[23], [24] to set the GPS position of the device to a desired
location, then uses the device to shoot a projected version of
the target video.
Citizen Evidence Lab [3] and Witness.Org [13] provide tu-
torials to train the public to create and to assess citizen reports,
including those captured with mobile devices. InformaCam [6]
provides mechanisms to ensure that the media was captured by
a specific device at a certain location and time. InformaCam is
however ineffective against adversaries that capture projected
videos: while the resulting videos are fraudulent, they have
been shot with the claimed device, at the claimed location and
time. While manual verifications can detect projection attacks,
they do not scale well to the high number of videos on social
media sites.
To address this problem, we exploit the observation that for
plagiarized videos, the motion encoded in the video stream is
likely inconsistent with the motion from the inertial sensor
streams (e.g., accelerometer) of the device. Movee [39], a
video liveness verification solution that uses this principle,
has important weaknesses: i) it is not user transparent to the
extent that it imposes an explicit verification step on users,
ii) it severely limits the movements in the verification step to
one of four pan movements, and iii) it is vulnerable to “stitch”
attacks in which the attacker creates a fraudulent video by first
live recording a genuine video and then pointing the camera
2to a pre-recorded target video.
In this paper, we introduce Vamos, a Video Accreditation
through Motion Signatures system. Vamos provides liveness
verifications for videos of arbitrary length. Vamos is com-
pletely transparent to the users; it requires no special user
interaction, nor change in user behavior.
Instead of enforcing an initial verification step, Vamos
uses the entire video and acceleration stream for verification
purposes: It divides the video and acceleration data into fixed
length chunks. It then classifies each chunk and uses the
results, along with a suite of novel features that we introduce,
to classify the entire sample. Vamos does not impose a
dominant motion direction, thus, does not constrain the user
movements. Instead, Vamos verifies the liveness of the video
by extracting features from all the directions of movement,
from both the video and acceleration streams.
Removed video length and movement constraints provide
additional flexibility for attackers to create fraudulent videos.
In order to study the security of the new unconstrained setting,
we i) propose a novel, motion based video classification sys-
tem, ii) introduce a suite of human centric and fully automated
attacks that target sensor based video liveness verification
systems, and iii) show experimental evidence on a wide range
of data collected through user studies and from public sources.
The attacks we introduce seek to produce accelerometer
readings that enable the attackers to thwart Vamos and claim
the production of plagiarized videos, on their mobile de-
vices. While some of the attacks leverage accelerometer data
produced on the attacker device, several attacks enable the
attacker to fabricate accelerometer readings of their choice.
Since Vamos leverages accelerometer data simultaneously
captured on the same device with the video, it can only validate
videos recorded using the Vamos “client” app, see Section III.
To evaluate Vamos, we have collected 150 citizen journalism
videos from YouTube and performed a user study to collect
160 free-form videos and corresponding acceleration samples.
Our experiments show that Vamos improves on the free-form
video motion verification accuracy of Movee by more than
15% in the domain of 6 second cluster and isandwich attack
videos, and by more than 30% in the domain of whole length
stitch attack videos (see Section III for the attack description).
We show that Vamos performs unexpectedly well on a suite
of mirror attack variants, that fabricate acceleration readings
based on video motion streams.
We posit that the success rate of the attacks depends on the
type of motions encoded in the video. Experiments with 6s
chunks extracted from the free-form videos confirm (through
χ2 and Fisher’s exact tests) that the classification performance
of Vamos depends on the video category. We show that the
proposed motion based video classification can be used to
predict the accuracy of Vamos on videos for which we cur-
rently lack associated sensor streams (e.g., YouTube videos).
To summarize, this paper makes the following contributions:
• Targeted attacks. Introduce a sensor based attack model
and develop manual and automatic attacks targeted
against video verification mechanisms. [§ III].
• Video motion classification. Introduce a novel classifi-
cation of mobile videos [§ IV].
• Vamos. Develop a video liveness verification solution to
detect fraudulent video and inertial sensor chunks that
encode arbitrary motions. Introduce Vamos, a system that
detects fraudulent video and accelerometer streams of
arbitrary length, and is resilient to powerful attacks [§ V].
• Video data collection. Collect datasets of free-form and
citizen journalism videos [§ VI].
• Extensive evaluation. Show that the performance of
Vamos is dependent on the video motion classification
[§ VII-C]. Predict the classification of Vamos on sensor-
less citizen journalism videos. Perform a realistic eval-
uation of Vamos on a mixture of attacks and video
categories, including on samples belonging to previously
unseen attacks and categories.
In our experiments we observe a surprising and seemingly
counter-intuitive resilience of Vamos against attacks on “sta-
tionary” video chunks. We argue this is due to the ability of
Vamos to exploit the involuntary user hand shakes that occur
during video capture sessions. Furthermore, our experiments
show that Vamos differentiates between genuine and fraudu-
lent video and acceleration samples of unconstrained length
and motion, with an accuracy that exceeds 93%.
II. THE PROBLEM, MOTIVATION
AND RELATED WORK
The problem of verifying the authenticity of videos up-
loaded to a social media site (e.g., from conflicts in Syria,
Ukraine or Venezuela) is paramount to the ability to use such
videos as evidence or trusted sources for journalism. Citizen
Evidence Lab observes that it is common occurrence during
complex emergencies and natural disasters for old pictures
and videos to be recycled as new online, and go viral due
to uncritical re-sharing through social networks [3].
This problem has several dimensions, that include assessing
the location and time of capture, or the content of the video.
For instance, CitizenEvidenceLab provides tutorials to train
the public to asses citizen videos from YouTube. It also
provides tools (e.g., YouTube DataViewer) to enable users to
extract the exact local upload time, all thumbnails and audio
only from YouTube videos.
Witness.Org [13] is an organization that trains and supports
people using video in their fight for human rights. It provides
a set of rules that enable concerned citizens to safely capture
quality videos that witness important events.
InformaCam [6] leverages the unique noise of the device
camera to sign content it produces, along with the output
of other sensors (e.g., GPS). This enables InformaCam to
authenticate that content has been produced with a certain
camera. InformaCam assumes that the sensor data is valid and
has not been fabricated, and is vulnerable to plagiarism attacks
where the attacker points the camera to a projected video.
In this paper we focus on liveness verifications: verify that
the video was captured on a mobile device, and has not been
fabricated using material from other sources.
Movee [39] is a liveness verification solution that imposes
a 6 second verification step on video capturing experiences:
before being allowed to shoot the desired video, the user is
3presented with a target (bullseye) symbol displayed randomly
either on the top, bottom, left or the right side of the screen.
The user needs to align the center of the screen to the bullseye,
by moving the device in its direction.
Movee uses the correspondence between the motion sensors
and video motion to provide a preliminary liveness verification
solution. Movee is however severely limited, as (i) the “veri-
fication” step is constrained to the initial few seconds of the
video, and (ii) the system dictates the user to pan the camera
in a specific direction rather than gracefully accept the natural
motion of the user. These limitations significantly impact the
practical application of Movee.
Furthermore, Movee is vulnerable to the potent attacks
that we study in this paper. For example, an attacker starts
Movee and points to a portion of a target video playing on
a projection screen, performs a pan motion as specified by
Movee, then points the camera to the whole frame of the fraud-
ulent video. Since Movee only uses the initial 6s chunk, the
resulting sample passes Movee’s verifications. Furthermore,
in Section VII-C we quantitatively show the ineffectiveness of
Movee for free-form movements even in 6s chunks: on the
attacks we introduce, Movee’s false positive rate is as low as
38% and its false negative rate is 28%.
We introduce Vamos to address these limitations and pro-
vide the first video liveness verification system that works on
unconstrained, free-form videos, does not impose a “verifica-
tion” step on users, and is resilient to a suite of powerful,
sensor based attacks.
This article extends our earlier work [38] with the mirror
attack and two complex variants, the (i, p, c)-mirror and
perturbed fingerprint attacks. We show that Vamos performs
surprisingly well on these attacks, and provide insights into
this result. We have also performed several new experiments:
(i) test Vamos on videos that belong to categories on which
it was not trained, (ii) test Vamos on instances fabricated
according to attacks on which it was not trained, and (iii)
train Vamos on instances belonging to all the video category
and attack types, before testing it.
Wang et al. [42] proposed a video and sensor based human
fingerprinting technique. They use uploaded videos of an
individual to extract a motion fingerprint, which is a string of
“micro-activities”, e.g., walking direction, stepping frequency,
stopping, turning. Vamos does not fingerprint humans in
videos, but only needs to extract information about the camera
direction of movement.
Jain et al. [35] introduced FOCUS, a Hadoop based video
analytics system that uses 3D model reconstruction and multi-
modal sensing to perform real time analysis and clustering of
user-uploaded video streams. While FOCUS is related to our
video classification effort, FOCUS is able to identify similar
videos uploaded by multiple users, e.g., of the same event,
even if captured from radically different vantage points.
Several video watermarking algorithms has been proposed
for video content authentication [43], [30]. The goal of Vamos
is however not to authenticate the recorded video, but to verify
the video liveness claim. We note that watermarking only
works if all the videos in the world employ it. Furthermore,
the defenses provided by invisible watermarks are defeated by
projection attacks.
Liu et al. [36] proposed a solution for summarizing (i.e.,
extracting important frames from) mobile videos captured
simultaneously with acceleration and orientation streams. The
acceleration values are used to exclude outliers. Abdollahian
et al. [25] define a “camera view” concept, and use camera
motion parameters to temporally segment, summarize and an-
notate user generated videos. It will be interesting to evaluate
a more efficient, video summary based Vamos that identifies
discrepancies between video and acceleration summaries.
III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
We consider a system that consists of a service provider
(e.g., YouTube [15], iReport [5], Stringwire [9]) and multiple
subscribers. The service provider offers an interface for sub-
scribers to upload videos captured on their mobile devices.
We assume subscribers own devices equipped with a camera
and inertial sensors (i.e., acceleration). Devices have Internet
connectivity, which, for the purpose of this work may be
intermittent. Each user is required to install an application on
her mobile device, which we henceforth denote as the “client”.
The client simultaneously captures video and acceleration
streams from the device. It then uploads them to her account
hosted by the service provider. The provider uses Vamos to
verify the data uploaded. Specifically, Vamos divides the video
and acceleration data into fixed length chunks. For each chunk,
it extracts motion vectors from the video and the accelerometer
streams, then generates features that encode the similarity of
the two motion vectors. Vamos uses these features to classify
each chunk as either genuine or fraudulent. Vamos uses the
results of the chunk level classifications to extract a second
set of features that model the similarity of the original, whole
video and acceleration data. It then uses supervised learning
to classify the uploaded video as genuine or fraudulent. If
genuine, the provider makes the video publicly accessible, but
keeps the acceleration stream secret, or even discards it.
We assume that while the service provider is honest, users
can be malicious. Users can fraudulently claim ownership
(creation) of videos they upload. We assume that attackers do
not have access to the acceleration stream of videos they intend
to plagiarize. Thus, they are required to fabricate acceleration
streams for the uploaded videos.
We introduce several manual and automatic attacks that
produce acceleration streams that “match” targeted videos. Va-
mos, or other sensor based video liveness verification systems
are not yet available in video hosting sites. Thus, the attacks
that we propose and implement here are hypothetical. How-
ever, our goal is to anticipate the adversarial strategy changes
likely to occur once video liveness verification systems are
adopted. This enables us to evaluate the resilience of Vamos to
such strategy changes, and be two steps ahead of adversaries.
Let A denote the algorithm used by the attacker. Let V
denote the “target” video that the attacker wants to plagiarize.
Let ΓA denote additional information used by the attacker.
For instance, ΓA may include other videos and corresponding
acceleration streams. We denote the output of A as A(V,ΓA)
= Acc, the acceleration stream produced for V .
4We introduce first the “sandwich” attack, that enables the
attacker to manually produce the acceleration data. This attack
conjectures that it should be easy for a human adversary to
emulate the movement observed in a target video and thus
“manually” produce a matching accelerometer stream.
Sandwich attack. The attacker studies the video V and
emulates the observed movement. For instance, A stacks
two devices. The attacker plays the target video V on the
top device. He then moves the device stack to emulate the
movement seen on the top device. The device on the bottom
records the resulting acceleration data, Acc. A outputs Acc.
We now describe the cluster attack: pair the target video
with the acceleration stream copied from a “similar” but
genuine sample. This attack explores the hypothesis that an
attacker with a large dataset of genuine video and accelerom-
eter streams, will be able to identify a pair whose motion
resembles the motion of the target video.
Cluster attack. A captures a dataset of genuine (video, accel-
eration) samples and stores them in ΓA. A uses a clustering
algorithm (e.g., K-means [27]) to cluster the videos based on
their movement. A classifies the target V according to its
movement and assigns it to one of the previously generated
clusters: the cluster containing videos whose movement is
closest to V . A randomly picks one of the genuine (video,
acceleration) samples in the cluster. Let (V ′, Acc′) be the
chosen sample. A outputs Acc′.
We now introduce fully automatic “mirror” attacks, that
copy the video motion stream into the accelerometer stream.
The hypothesis explored by this attack is that since identical
video and accelerometer streams will “match” perfectly, they
will be accepted as genuine.
Perfect mirror attack. Given a target video V , the adversary
A extracts its video motion stream (e.g., using the VMA mod-
ule of Section V-B) and uses it to set the attack acceleration
stream, Acc. The output of the attack consists of (V , Acc).
Thus, this attack “mirrors” the video motion stream into the
acceleration stream.
In Section VII-C we show that the above hypothesis
does not hold: Vamos achieves perfect accuracy against the
perfect mirror attack. This is because a classifier easily learns
that perfect matches are fraudulent. In the following, we
introduce two variations on this attack. The intuition behind
these two attacks is that perturbations in the accelerometer
data produce imperfect, but still “close” matches, resulting in
genuine looking video and accelerometer data.
(i, p, c)-mirror attack. After copying the motion stream ex-
tracted from the target video V , into the fabricated acceleration
stream Acc, the adversary A performs a (p, i, c) alteration of
the stream. Specifically, A inserts i points in the accelerometer
stream, randomly perturbs each accelerometer reading between
−p and p percent, then applies a calibration factor c. We detail
the process and the choice of the parameters, in Section VI-C.
The PFA attack fabricates an accelerometer stream as
a patch of tiny snippets that emulate real life data in the
number of “errors” when matching against the plagiarized
video stream. We conjecture that such an accelerometer stream
produces a more realistic match. Specifically, PFA perturbs
the copied video motion stream for each snippet, to produce
a video and acceleration snippet that will have an amount
of “inconsistency” that emulates the inconsistency between a
similar, but genuine video and acceleration snippet.
Perturbed fingerprint attack (PFA). Given a target video
V , PFA initializes the fraudulent acceleration stream Acc
to the motion stream of V . PFA generalizes the (i, p, c)-
mirror attack. Unlike the (i, p, c)-mirror attack, that uses
a single set of perturbation factors, PFA splits V and Acc
into 0.5s “snippets”, and dynamically determines the amount
of perturbation to be applied to each snippet. For this, PFA
leverages a “dictionary” that it constructs from set of genuine
video and acceleration samples. We provide implementation
details in Section VI-C.
Next we introduce the stitch attack, that concatenates a
plagiarized (video, acceleration) chunk with several genuine
chunks. The intuition behind this attack is that video and
accelerometer streams that differ only on a few sections,
will have a high similarity, due to the genuine chunks. This
similarity will make it harder for a sensor based video liveness
verification solution to differentiate fraudulent and genuine
data. In Section VI-C we construct stitched samples from
multiple fraudulent and genuine chunks.
Stitch attack. A takes as input parameters the target video
V and two integers, g > 0 and 0 ≤ k ≤ g. A first
creates a set of genuine video and acceleration chunks, ΓA
= {(V1, Acc1), .., (V1, Accg)}, e.g., by capturing them on the
mobile device. A uses one of the above attacks to fabricate
Acc, an acceleration stream for V . A then “stitches” the
fake chunk (V,Acc) with the genuine chunks ΓA, according
to the index k. Let || denote the concatenation operation,
applicable both to video and acceleration streams. Then, A
outputs (Va, Acca), where Va = V1||..Vk−1||V ||Vk+1..||Vg and
Acca = Acc1 || .. Acck−1 || Acc || Acck+1 .. || Accg.
Difficulty of implementing the attacks. Each of the above
attacks require the attacker to write code, either to collect
sensor data, to implement a video motion based clustering
algorithm, to copy and perturb video motion data, or to stitch
accelerometer streams from multiple sources. We note that
while an adversary can easily follow the attack description
to implement the code, this only needs to be done by one
person, who can then share or even sell it to regular, but
adversarial users, who want to thwart sensor based video
liveness verification defenses.
The cluster attack requires the adversary to manually collect
a dataset of video and accelerometer streams. While the dataset
collection is a difficult task, it is a one time effort. The
sandwich attack, similarly requires manual effort. However,
different from the cluster attack, that effort needs to be invested
for each video targeted for plagiarism.
We conclude that strictly automatic attacks (i.e., the mirror
attack and variants) are the easiest to perform. The manual
attack (sandwich) and hybrid manual and automatic attack
(cluster) are harder to perform as they also require human
intervention. However, we note that the cluster attack can be
fully automated if attackers pool their resources to collect
and share the dataset of video and accelerometer streams. In
addition, in our experiments, see Section VI-C, we observed
that the two participants asked to perform the sandwich attack
5Category ID Distance to
subject
User Motion Camera Mo-
tion
1 Close Standing Stationary
2 Far Standing Stationary
3 Close Walking Stationary
4 Far Walking Stationary
5 Close Standing Scanning
6 Far Standing Scanning
7 Close Walking Scanning
8 Far Walking Scanning
9 Close Standing Following
10 Far Standing Following
11 Close Walking Following
12 Far Walking Following
TABLE I
VIDEO MOTION CATEGORIES, BASED ON (I) CAMERA DISTANCE TO THE
SUBJECT, (II) THE USER MOTION AND (III) CAMERA MOTION.
on real videos, took only seconds to study the target video and
capture accelerometer data.
IV. A CLASSIFICATION OF MOBILE VIDEOS
We posit that the success rate of the attacks previously
introduced depends on the type of motions encoded in the
video. For instance, it seems intuitive that videos where the
hand-held device is stationary are easier to plagiarize. To
verify our conjecture, we propose a general classification of
videos captured on mobile devices, based on the following
dimensions:
• User motion: We consider two types of recorder mo-
tions, “standing” and “walking”, but no motions such as
jumping or driving.
• Camera motion: We consider three types of camera mo-
tions: “stationary”, “scanning” and “following”. “Scan-
ning” means the camera moves in a direction (e.g., left to
right) at a pace independent of the subject of the video.
“Following” means the camera moves to maintain the
subject within the confines of the video. We have not
considered videos shot with head mounted cameras.
• Distance to subject: We consider video subjects that
are either “close” or “far” to the camera. If the camera
focuses on the subject of the video and only a limited
area of the background is observed in the video, we say
the subject is “close”. Otherwise, the subject is “far”.
Table I shows the resulting 12 mobile video categories. Fig-
ure 6 shows the category distribution of YouTube and free-
form video sets we collected (§ VI-A and § VII-A).
V. VAMOS: VIDEO ACCREDITATION
THROUGH MOTION SIGNATURES
In this section we introduce Vamos (Video Accreditation
Through Motion Signatures) an un-constrained video liveness
analysis system. The verifications of Vamos leverage the entire
video and acceleration sample. This is in contrast with Movee,
that relies only on the initial section of the sample. Vamos
consists of the three step process illustrated in Figure 2. First,
it divides the input sample into equal length chunks. Second,
it classifies each chunk as either genuine or fraudulent. Third,
it combines the results of the second step with a suite of novel
Fig. 2. Illustration of the Vamos architecture and operation. Vamos consists
of three steps, (i) “chunking”, to divide the (video, acceleration) sample, (ii)
chunk level classification, and (iii) sample level classification.
Fig. 3. Chunk extraction illustration. For segment based chunking, the first
segment produces a single usable chunk. For random chunking, chunk 3
overlaps both chunks 1 and 2.
features to produce a final decision for the original sample. In
the following, we detail each of these steps.
A. Chunk Extraction
The “chunking” process divides a video and acceleration
sample S = (V,Acc) into fixed length chunks. We consider
a 1s granularity of division. While 6s is the chunk length we
use in the experiments, we consider here a parameter l to
denote the length in seconds of the chunks. We call a transition
point to be the time when the sample transitions from one
video motion category to another (e.g., from category 4 to
category 8). Let a transition chunk, denote a l second chunk
that contains parts that belong to multiple video categories.
Let V [s, t] and Acc[s, t] denote a segment of V and Acc that
starts at second s and ends at second t. The chunking process
produces a set C of chunks, initially empty. Let L denote the
length of the (V,Acc) sample.
We propose three chunking techniques, illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. Sequential chunking is the obvious way of dividing
arbitrary length streams into chunks. Segment based chunking
attempts to make the division such that each chunk has a
consistent video motion class. The output of sequential and
segment based chunking is easy to predict by an adversary.
Randomized chunking addresses this problem, by performing
the division at random positions.
Sequential chunking. Divide (V,Acc) into sequential chunks,
starting with the beginning. Let n = |C| = ⌈L/l⌉. Then,
C ={(V [0, l − 1], Acc[0, l − 1]), (V [l, 2l − 1], Acc[l, 2l −
1])..(V [l(c− 1), lc− 1], Acc[l(c− 1), lc− 1])}.
6Segment based chunking. Identify the transition points of
the sample (V,Acc). Let a sample segment denote the part
of a sample between either (i) the beginning of the sample
and the first transition point, (ii) two transition points, or (iii)
the last transition point and the end of the sample. Discard
all segments of (V,Acc) whose length is less than l. Divide
remaining segments according to the sequential chunking
described above.
Randomized chunking. Produces k chunks, 0 < k ≤ L,
where k is an input argument, as follows. Generate k different
index values within the sample, 0 ≤ i1, .., ik ≤ L such that for
any s and t, 1 ≤ s, t ≤ k, is+ l 6= it. For each ij , j = 1..k, if
ij ≤ L− l, then C = C ∪ (V [ij, ij+ l−1], Acc[ij, ij+ l−1]).
Otherwise, C = C ∪ (V [ij − l, ij], Acc[ij − l, ij]).
Sequential chunking may produce transition chunks, that
contain one or more transition points. Segment based chunking
will not produce transition chunks. However, segment based
chunking requires a mechanism to identify transition points.
Randomized chunking can produce transition chunks and also
overlapping chunks. Sequential and segment based chunking
produce strictly non-overlapping chunks.
B. CL-Vamos: Chunk Level Verification
In the second step, Vamos classifies each chunk produced
by the first step, as either genuine or fraudulent. While
Movee [39] works on fixed length chunks, it is limited to video
and inertial sensor streams that encode one of 4 movements
(up, down, to the left, or to the right). Specifically, 3 of the 14
features of Movee are (i) the placement of the bullseye relative
to the center of the screen, (ii) the dominant video motion
direction and (iii) the dominant sensor motion direction.
We introduce here CL-Vamos, the first liveness verification
solution that works on free form chunks, that encode unre-
stricted movements. Similar to Movee, CL-Vamos analyzes the
consistency of the inferred motion from the simultaneously
and independently captured video and acceleration streams.
First, it uses an efficient image processing method to infer
a motion vector over the timeline of the video from frame-
by-frame progress. Second, it converts the raw inertial sen-
sor readings into a motion vector over the same timeline.
Third, CL-Vamos uses the Dynamic Time Warping algorithm
(DTW) [37] to find the set of operations that minimizes the
cost of converting one vector to the other. We now detail
each of these steps. The first two steps are borrowed from
Movee [39] and are thus only briefly described.
Video Motion Analysis (VMA). Given as input the captured
video stream, the VMA module outputs an estimate for the
direction and magnitude of the camera movement. Given
pairs of consecutive frames, VMA uses “phase correlation”
to find the movement of the camera and output a frame-by-
frame displacement vector. Specifically, phase correlation finds
the shift between two consecutive frames that minimizes the
difference between the two frames. It leverages the Fourier
shift property: a shift in the spatial domain of two images
results in a linear phase difference in the frequency domain of
the Fourier Transform (FT) [33]. It then performs an element-
wise multiplication of the transformed images, computes the
inverse Fourier transform (IFT) of the result, and finds the
shift that corresponds to the maximum amplitude - producing
the resultant displacement.
VMA applies the phase correlation method to obtain linear
shifts between frames in both the x and y axes. It then
computes the cumulative shift along the x and y axes by adding
up the linear shifts for all consecutive frames retrieved from
that video. The cumulative shifts on the x and y axes, along
with the orientation of the camera, enable VMA to infer the
camera direction of movement. We use the cumulative shifts
and camera motion direction as feature descriptors.
Inertial Sensor Motion Analysis (IMA). The Inertial Sensor
Motion Analysis (IMA) module leverages the accelerometer
sensor in order to produce a motion direction and magnitude;
this data will be used to verify its consistency with the
output of the VMA module. Given the raw accelerometer
data, captured at a 16Hz frequency, the IMA module uses
a combination of low-pass and high-pass filters in order to
remove the effects of gravity. IMA then uses the filtered
accelerometer data to extract the motion direction and distance
of the device, producing 3 cumulative shift vectors, one along
each of the x, y and z axes.
Similarity Computation (SC). The Similarity Computation
(SC) module compares the two motion sequences computed
by the VMA and the IMA modules. It returns a set of features
that summarize the nature of the similarity between the two
sequences. In Movee, the SC module computes the similarity
of the two motion sequences on only one axis, i.e., the
dominant direction of movement.
CL-Vamos is not restricted to the dominant direction of
movement and removes the features extracted from it. Instead,
we have investigated a wide range of features on both the x
and y axes. Due to lack of space we report and evaluate here
(see Section VII) the feature combination that achieved the
best performance. Specifically, CL-Vamos computes the DTW
between the motion vectors extracted from the projections of
the video and acceleration streams on both the x and y axes.
For each axis, DTW returns the number of diagonal, expansion
and contraction moves that convert one vector to the other, and
the cost of the resulting transformation. CL-Vamos uses this
information to generate the following features, for both the x
and y axes:
• The DTW distance (transformation cost) between the
video frame shift and acceleration streams.
• The ratio of overlap points: the number of overlapping
points in the two motion vectors divided by the length of
the vectors.
• The ratio of diagonal, expansion and contraction moves
to the number of points in the vectors.
Classification. Manually identifying threshold values for the
above metrics, that would differentiate between fraudulent and
genuine samples, is a difficult task, made even more complex
by the adversarial setup of the problem: the adversary could
exploit knowledge of explicit threshold values. Instead, we
leverage supervised learning algorithms to perform this task
automatically, learning threshold values from multiple genuine
and fraudulent data samples.
Specifically, CL-Vamos uses the above features, along with
other Movee features (e.g., the cumulative shift of the video
7and accelerometer on the x and y axes), with supervised
learning to train classifiers. For each chunk Ci in C, let
ci ∈ {genuine, fake} denote the classification produced by
CL-Vamos, and let ai ∈ {genuine, fake} denote the actual
status of the chunk. We consider a “positive” to denote a fake
chunk, and a “negative” to denote a genuine chunk.
We observe that the false positive rate of CL-Vamos,
FPR = Pr(ci = fake|ai = genuine). That is, the
false positive rate denotes the probability that a chunk is
classified as fake (positive), given that the chunk is in
fact genuine. Similarly, the false negative rate is FNR =
Pr(ci = genuine|ai = fake), the true positive rate is TPR =
Pr(ci = fake|ai = fake) and the true positive rate is TNR
= Pr(ci = genuine|ai = genuine).
C. Vamos: Whole Video Classification
Let us assume that for a sample S = (V,Acc), f chunks
in C have been classified as fraudulent and g chunks have
been classified as genuine. Let n = f + g = |C|. We say S
is genuine iff ∀i = 1..n, ai = “gen”. S is fake if ∃i, i =
1..n, s.t., ai = “fake”. We can write the probability that the
sample S = (V,Acc) is fake, Pr(S = fake), given the above
classification result, as
Pr[S = fake|
g∧
i=1
(ci = gen),
n∧
i=g+1
(ci = fake)] =
= 1−Πgi=1Pr(ai = gen|ci = gen)×
Πni=g+1Pr(ai = gen|ci = fake).
Let α = Pr(ai = gen|ci = gen), for any of the chunks Ci
in C. Similarly, let β = Pr(ai = gen|ci = fake). Then, we
have that Pr(S = fake) = 1 − αg × βf . Now, based on
Bayes’ theorem, we have that
α = TNR×Pr(ai=genuine)
TNR×Pr(ai=genuine)+FNR×Pr(ai=fake)
. Similarly, we
have that β = FPR×Pr(ai=genuine)
FPR×Pr(ai=genuine)+TPR×Pr(ai=fake)
. We
can compute thus α and β as a function of Pr(ai =
genuine) and Pr(ai = fake). We obtain these probabil-
ity values statistically, based on the performance of CL-
Vamos on a large number of chunks. Specifically, Pr(ai =
fake) = Nr. of fake chunks
Total nr. of chunks
and Pr(ai = genuine) =
Nr. of genuine chunks
Total nr. of chunks
, see Section VII-F.
We introduce several mechanisms to classify samples as
genuine or fraudulent. First, we propose a majority voting
approach, where a sample S = (V,Acc) is classified as
fraudulent if more than a threshold of the chunks of S have
been classified by CL-Vamos as fraudulent: f
f+g > thr.
The threshold thr is a parameter that will be determined
experimentally. Second, we consider a probabilistic approach
that labels a sample as fake if Pr(S = fake) = 1− αg × βf
is larger than a threshold value. We experiment with threshold
values in Section VII-F. Third, we propose a classifier based
approach, that uses the following novel features:
• Results of CL-Vamos: The number of fraudulent chunks,
f and the number of genuine chunks g. The classification
results ci, ∀i = 1..n. The probability that the sample S
is fake, Pr(S = fake).
• Aggregate features: For each of the 18 features of CL-
Vamos, compute the minimum, maximum, average and
standard deviation of the feature’s values over ci, ∀i =
1..n, as new features.
Vamos uses these features with supervised learning to train
classifiers for samples of arbitrary length and motion types.
VI. DATA COLLECTION
We have collected datasets of citizen journalism videos from
YouTube and of free-form (video, accelerometer) samples
from real users. We have also created datasets of fraudulent
samples following the attacks introduced in Section III. In the
following we detail each dataset.
A. YouTube Video Collection
We have collected 150 random citizen journalism videos from
YouTube, in the following manner. First, we have identified
relevant topics using Wikipedia’s “Current
Events” site [12], BBC [1] and CNN [2]. They include political
events (e.g., Ukraine, Venezuela, Middle East), natural disas-
ters (e.g., earthquakes, tsunamis, meteorite landing), extreme
sports and wild life encounters. We have used keywords from
such events to identify videos in YouTube that have been
captured by a regular person, using a mobile camera. We have
discarded videos shot by a professional cameraman or using a
head mounted camera. We collected the 150 videos from 139
users accounts. We have made public this list of videos [16].
The total length of the 150 videos is 13,107 seconds. We
analyze this dataset in Section VII-A.
B. Free-Form Video Collection
In previous work, Saini et al. [40] collected a dataset
of 473 video clips (along with accelerometer and compass
readings) simultaneously recorded by users attending the same
performance events. Cricri et al. [31], [32] exploit auxiliary
sensor data to infer information about the video content. They
show that multiple user records of a common scene can be
used to detect generic and specific events.
Instead, we performed a user study to simultaneously collect
mobile videos shot by users without any motion restrictions,
and the associated accelerometer readings. We first briefly
describe the implementation of Vamos, then detail the free-
form video collection process.
Vamos implementation. We have implemented the Vamos
client using Android, and a server component using C++,
R and PHP. We used the OpenCV (Open Source Computer
Vision) library [7] for the video motion analysis. We used
Nexus 4 smartphones (Android OS Jelly Bean version 4.2 with
1.5 GHz CPU) to experiment with Vamos. Nexus 4 captures
video at 30 fps (frames per second) and samples accelerometer
readings at a rate of 16.67Hz [8]. The code is available on the
project website [10].
Ethical considerations. We have used the Vamos application
to collect video and acceleration samples from real life users.
We have worked with the Institutional Review Board (protocol
number IRB-13-0582) at FIU to ensure an ethical interaction
with the users and collection of the data.
8Category Chunk count Category Chunk count
1 26 8 28
2 50 9 26
3&7 82 10 35
4 18 11 28
5 44 12 22
6 42
TABLE II
NUMBER OF CHUNKS OF THE FREE-FORM DATASET, PER CATEGORY.
DETAILS IN SECTION VII-A.
Free-form data set. We have collected data from 16 users1.
Each user was asked to use Vamos, following the instructions
shown on the screen: move the device in any direction to
capture videos. Each user contributed 10 free-form videos
and accelerometer data, producing a free-form dataset of 160
videos. We have manually annotated the free-form dataset
video samples according to the categories described in Table I.
We have divided each sample of the free-form dataset into
6s chunks, using segment based chunking (see Section V),
producing a total of 401 genuine chunks. Table II shows the
distribution of the chunks into categories. We have made the
free-form dataset publicly available [10].
C. Attack Datasets
We have used the free-form dataset (see Section VI-B) to
create the following attack datasets.
Sandwich attack dataset. Two skilled users have performed
the sandwich attack on the 160 free-form video dataset. We
have used the following procedure, for each whole video (not
at chunk level). The attacker watches the target video an
unlimited number of times. The attacker stacks two phones.
The attacker plays the target video on the top device. The
bottom device records the acceleration readings during the
session. The attacker can shoot any number of takes, until
satisfied with the result.
We combine the original video with the resulting attack
acceleration sample to produce a “sandwich sample”. We
used the segment based chunking method to divide each
sandwich sample into 6s (video,acceleration). Thus, each
sandwich chunk corresponds to one of the free-form chunks.
The sandwich chunk dataset contains thus 401 genuine and
401 fraudulent chunks.
Cluster attack dataset. We ran K-means clustering [27] on
the free-form chunk dataset, to cluster the chunks according to
their motion (see Cluster attack). We applied the v-fold cross-
validation algorithm [26] to determine the optimal number
of clusters in our dataset. The outcome was K = 6. The
cluster attack dataset consists of two subsets, of genuine and
fraudulent (video, acceleration) chunks. We used the free-form
chunk dataset as the genuine data. To create the fraudulent
subset, for each genuine chunk, we randomly chose another
chunk from the same (motion) cluster. We then coupled the
video from the first chunk with the inertial sensor data of the
randomly selected chunk. Thus, the genuine and fraudulent
subsets of the cluster attack dataset each contain 401 chunks.
111 are males and 5 females, aged 23-32, occupation including biology,
fashion design, unemployed, and software, civil and electrical engineering
Perfect mirror attack dataset. For each of the 401 genuine
chunks, we have created a perfect mirror fraudulent chunk:
We copied the video from the genuine chunk, and set its
accelerometer stream to be the motion stream we extract from
the video. Thus, the perfect mirror attack dataset consists of
401 genuine and 401 fraudulent chunks.
(i, p, c)-mirror attack dataset. For each genuine chunk,
we have created a fraudulent chunk. Similar to the (i, p, c)-
mirror attack, we have initialized the acceleration stream of
the fraudulent chunk with the video motion stream. Then, we
performed a 3 step alteration of the acceleration stream as fol-
lows. First, stretch the acceleration stream: between each pair
of consecutive acceleration readings, we insert i ∈R {2, 3}
new points. The value of each inserted reading is set to be
equal to the mean of the previous and next readings in the
stream. The reason for the stretching step is that in Vamos,
the ratio of the number of acceleration readings to the video
motion readings is around 2.5.
Second, “perturb” each resulting accelerometer reading a,
to a value chosen randomly in the interval [a(1 − p), a(1 +
p)]. We have chosen p = 0.1 for our experiments, as it is
sufficient to prevent suspicious, perfect matches between the
video and acceleration streams, and also to prevent the creation
of random acceleration streams. Third, multiply each resulting
acceleration value by an empirically chosen factor c ∈R [1, 2].
This step “calibrates” the acceleration stream to the observed
range of 1 to 2 higher than the video motion readings, of
genuine samples.
Perturbed fingerprint attack (PFA) attack dataset. PFA
uses 10% (40) of the chunks in the 401 genuine chunk
dataset, to build the dictionaryThe dictionary consists of
10 buckets, each corresponding to one of the intervals
[0, 10), [10, 20), .., [90 − 100]. For each of the 40 chunks,
PFA does the following. First, split the chunk (video and
acceleration) into 0.5s long snippets. Compute the DTW of the
snippet and generate the DTW’s percentage of match moves
out of all the moves. Identify the bucket whose range contains
this value, and add the snippet to it. The dictionary contains
480 = 40× 6× 0.5 genuine snippets.
PFA randomly picks half of the remaining 361 (401-41)
chunks to be genuine, and half to generate fraudulent chunks.
It uses the dictionary to extend the (i, p, c)-mirror attack and
create the fraudulent chunks. For each fraudulent chunk, PFA
performs the following steps. First, replace the acceleration
stream with the motion stream extracted from the video. Split
the resulting sample into 0.5s long snippets. For each snippet
(identified as snp in the following), use the video part to
identify the nearest neighbor (in terms of motion) snippet
from the dictionary. Use the bucket of the nearest neighbor
to determine the amount of perturbation to be applied to the
acceleration of snp. Specifically, pick a random value x within
the interval of the bucket of the nearest neighbor. x percent of
the accelerometer readings of snp will remain unchanged, to
contribute to x% match moves. Randomly pick 1−x% of the
accelerometer readings of snp, and apply an (i, p, c)-mirror
transformation to them. The i and c values are set as in the
(i, p, c)-mirror transformation. The perturbation factor p is a
parameter to this dataset, see Section VII-C.
9Fig. 4. Stitch attack example. For a genuine sample of 3 chunks, the attacker
produces 3 fake samples, with 1 to 3 fake (red) chunks. The genuine chunks
are copied from the genuine sample.
Stitch attack datasets. We have built two stitch attack
datasets, one based on the fake cluster chunks and one on
the fake sandwich chunks of the previous two attack datasets.
The construction process is the following. First, we discarded
4 out of the 160 free-form samples, as they do not have a
6s chunk belonging to a single category. We then discarded
43 samples that have only one chunk. For each of the 113
remaining samples (that has at least 2 chunks), we construct
3 fraudulent samples. For instance, for a 2 chunk genuine
sample, we create a fraudulent sample having the first chunk
fake, the second genuine, one where the first chunk is genuine,
but the second is fake, and one where both chunks are fake.
For samples with more than 3 chunks, the position of the
fake chunks in any of the 3 created fake samples is randomly
selected. The fake chunks are from either the sandwich or the
cluster chunk datasets.
Figure 4 illustrates the generation of fraudulent samples
given a genuine free-form sample of 3 chunks. The reason
for dropping samples with less than 2 chunks is that we need
to create the same number of fake samples given any genuine
sample (3 fakes per genuine sample). Samples with 1 chunk
cannot produce 3 fake stitch samples, thus had to be discarded.
The resulting stitch datasets based on the cluster and sandwich
attacks have thus each 339 fake samples ((160− 4− 43)× 3).
VII. EVALUATION
We first report our experience in classifying the collected
video datasets. We then evaluate the ability of CL-Vamos to
classify 6s chunks from the free-form dataset, as either genuine
or fraudulent. Finally, we evaluate the performance of Vamos
on the whole length samples from the free-form dataset.
Metrics. In the following, the TPR (True Positive Rate)
metric denotes the fraction of videos correctly identified as
fraudulent, the FPR (False Positive Rate) denotes the fraction
of videos incorrectly identified as fraudulent and the FNR
(False Negative Rate) denotes the fraction of videos incorrectly
identified as genuine. Accuracy denotes the ratio of the number
of video correctly classified (either as fraudulent or genuine) to
the total number of videos classified (including those correctly
and incorrectly classified).
A. Video Dataset Classification
Two users (paper authors) have manually annotated the
YouTube and free-form datasets based on the criteria described
in Section IV. Since a single video can include sections
belonging to different motion categories, the result of the
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Fig. 5. Distribution of motion categories of 150 YouTube citizen journalism
videos, produced by the manual annotation of two users. We observe a
consistent outcome of the annotation.
annotation process consists of tuples of the form (start time,
end time, category id), where the first two fields denote the
start and end time of a video section (measured in seconds)
and the last field denotes the id of the video category (integer
ranging from 1 to 12). At the end of the process, we have
computed a tally of the number of seconds of video belonging
to each of the 12 video motion categories.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of each video motion cat-
egory in the collected videos, as produced by the two anno-
tators. We observe a similar outcome for the two annotators.
Motion categories 2 and 1 have the largest, whereas categories
12, 8, 9 and 10 have the smallest representation.
The manual process enabled us to detect a discrepancy
between the annotations of two users, for categories 3 and 7.
Specifically, a walking user recording a nearby scene without
moving the camera, produces a video that can be (visually)
categorized as either 3 or 7. We have labeled these video
with a separate category denoted by “3&7”. Similarly, when
a standing user is following a moving subject, but the subject
is moving toward (or away from) the camera, the camera
movement of the resulting video can be interpreted as either
following or stationary.
Figure 6(a) shows the overall category distribution of the
YouTube dataset, as an average of the distributions of the two
annotators. The motion categories 2 and 1 have the largest
representation, whereas category 12 has the smallest repre-
sentation. Figure 6(b) shows the category distribution of the
free-form dataset, and Table II shows the category distribution
of the free-form chunks. The difference in distributions of the
YouTube and free-form datasets is likely due to the fact that the
free-form video collection scenarios have different dynamics
from citizen journalism scenarios.
B. Experiment Setup for CL-Vamos
CL-Vamos uses supervised learning algorithms to determine
if a video is genuine. We have experimented with several
classifiers, including MultiLayer Perceptron (MLP) [34], De-
cision Trees (DT) (C4.5), Random Forest (RF) [29] and
Bagging [28]. We have used the Weka data mining suite [11]
to perform the experiments, with default settings. For the
backpropagation algorithm of the MLP classifier, we set the
learning rate to 0.3 and the momentum rate to 0.2.
To compare CL-Vamos and Movee [39] on the 11 video
categories, we have designed three experiments, that evaluate
10
Fig. 6. (a) Motion category distribution for YouTube dataset. (b) Distribution
for free-form dataset. Table I defines the 12 categories.
Category TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
1 83.33 75.0 16.67 60.0
2 63.63 44.44 36.36 60.0
3&7 90.0 47.6 10.0 70.73
4 100.0 40.0 0.0 75.0
5 72.73 42.85 27.27 66.67
6 75.0 50.0 25.0 61.11
8 75.0 57.14 25.0 54.55
9 76.9 40.0 23.07 72.22
10 70.0 57.1 30.0 58.82
11 83.3 60.0 16.7 63.63
12 66.67 33.33 33.33 66.67
TABLE III
CL-VAMOS CATEGORY CENTRIC EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR CLUSTER
ATTACK. THE ACCURACY IS LOW, RANGING BETWEEN 54% AND 72%.
different scenarios. In a “category centric” test, for each
category c, we use 80% randomly selected data from c for
training and the rest of 20% for testing. This test evaluates the
solution when only knowledge of the video’s category exists.
In a “mixed data” experiment, for each category c, we split the
data into 10 equal sized folds. Then, in each of 10 iterations,
we train the classifier on 9 folds from all the categories, and
test on the data of the remaining fold from c. Repeat the
procedure 10 times, ensuring each fold of c appears once in the
test dataset. This test evaluates performance when knowledge
of all the categories exists. In the third, “novelty” test, for each
category c, we train the supervised learning algorithm on all
the data from all the categories with the exception of c. We
then test the algorithm on all the data from c. This experiment
aims to predict performance on samples whose video motion
category has not been seen before.
C. CL-Vamos: Attack Detection
Detection of the cluster attack. We first compare the per
category performance of CL-Vamos and Movee on the cluster
attack dataset (see Section VI-C). For CL-Vamos, we have
used the Random Forest algorithm, as it performed the best
in our experiments. Table III shows our results for the “cate-
gory” experiment, including the true positive rate (TPR), false
positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR) and accuracy
(Acc). We observe a low accuracy, ranging between 54%
(category 8) and 72% (category 9). Table IV shows the TPR,
FPR, FNR and accuracy results for CL-Vamos on the “mixed
data” experiment. The per category accuracy ranges between
75% and 85%, a significant increase over the “category”
Category TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
1 75.0 16.67 25.0 80.0
2 82.13 16.67 17.87 83.33
3&7 87.97 27.0 12.03 77.08
4 75.0 25.0 25.0 75.0
5 80.0 2.86 20.0 83.33
6 68.33 13.9 31.67 79.17
8 75.0 0.0 25.0 80.0
9 77.66 16.67 22.34 80.0
10 91.67 38.86 8.33 75.0
11 83.25 6.25 16.75 85.0
12 75.0 25.0 25.0 81.25
TABLE IV
CL-VAMOS MIXED DATA EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR CLUSTER ATTACK.
THE ACCURACY IS AS HIGH AS 85% (ON CATEGORY 11.) WE OBSERVE
THAT KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER CATEGORIES SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVES THE
ACCURACY OF CL-VAMOS.
Category TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
1 80.8 30.7 19.2 75.0
2 92.0 18.0 8.0 87.0
3&7 96.1 21.6 3.9 87.25
4 81.0 4.8 19.0 88.09
5 93.3 26.7 6.7 83.33
6 81.8 27.3 18.2 77.27
8 89.3 21.4 10.7 83.93
9 84.4 42.2 15.6 71.11
10 93.0 27.9 7.0 82.56
11 92.9 32.1 7.1 80.36
12 95.5 18.2 4.5 88.64
TABLE V
CL-VAMOS NOVELTY EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR CLUSTER ATTACK.
KNOWLEDGE OF DATA FROM ALL OTHER CATEGORIES ENABLES
CL-VAMOS TO ACCURATELY CLASSIFY A NOVEL CATEGORY.
experiment. This shows that additional data, even from other
categories, can benefit the performance of CL-Vamos. This is
confirmed by the “novelty” experiment, see Table V: While
its lowest accuracy is 71%, its highest accuracy is 88%. Thus,
even with knowledge only from other categories, CL-Vamos
can accurately classify chunks from a newly seen category.
Figure 7 summarizes the per-category accuracy achieved by
CL-Vamos in the category centric, mixed data and novelty
experiments. In the mixed data and novelty experiments, CL-
Vamos consistently achieves better performance than on the
category centric experiment.
Detection of the sandwich attack. We now evaluate CL-
Vamos on the sandwich attack dataset of Section VI-C. Ta-
ble VI shows the its performance on the category centric ex-
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Fig. 7. Summary of CL-Vamos accuracy on chunk-level cluster attack dataset.
The novelty test results are surprisingly good: even without knowledge of a
category, CL-Vamos achieves an accuracy ranging between 71% and 88% (for
categories 4 and 12 respectively).
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Category TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
1 83.33 50.0 16.7 70.0
2 60.0 20.0 40.0 70.0
3&7 77.78 30.0 22.22 73.68
4 66.67 0.0 33.33 87.5
5 66.67 33.33 33.33 66.67
6 80.0 33.33 20.0 75.0
8 80.0 40.0 20.0 70.0
9 60.0 28.57 40.0 64.71
10 70.0 16.7 30.0 75.0
11 75.0 42.9 25.0 63.63
12 100.0 50.0 0.0 87.5
TABLE VI
CL-VAMOS CATEGORY CENTRIC EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR THE
SANDWICH ATTACK DATASET. THE ACCURACY RANGES BETWEEN 64%
AND 87%, A MARKED IMPROVEMENT OVER THE CORRESPONDING
EXPERIMENT ON THE CLUSTER ATTACK DATASET.
Category TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
1 75.0 10.0 25.0 84.0
2 66.67 16.67 33.33 73.33
3&7 81.34 22.58 18.66 78.75
4 83.34 12.5 16.66 80.0
5 66.0 31.32 34.0 68.75
6 69.34 28.0 30.66 70.0
8 86.0 6.66 14.0 88.0
9 74.34 20.0 25.66 84.0
10 66.67 8.0 33.33 77.14
11 83.34 27.34 16.66 72.0
12 76.68 0.0 23.32 85.0
TABLE VII
CL-VAMOS MIXED DATA EXPERIMENT ON THE SANDWICH ATTACK
DATASET. ACCURACY RANGES FROM 68% TO 88%.
Category TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
1 80.8 34.6 19.2 73.08
2 68.0 22.9 32.0 72.45
3&7 70.6 25.6 29.4 72.34
4 95.0 33.3 5.0 81.58
5 77.78 44.18 22.23 67.05
6 77.3 34.2 22.7 71.95
8 89.3 20.8 10.7 84.62
9 53.33 24.39 46.67 63.95
10 79.1 37.8 20.9 71.25
11 64.3 32.1 25.7 66.07
12 90.9 0.0 9.1 95.0
TABLE VIII
CL-VAMOS NOVELTY EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR THE SANDWICH ATTACK
DATASET. THE ACCURACY RANGES BETWEEN 63% (CATEGORY 9) AND
95% (CATEGORY 8). THE IMPROVEMENT IS THUS NOT CONSISTENT
ACROSS ALL THE VIDEO CATEGORIES.
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Fig. 8. CL-Vamos accuracy on the sandwich attack dataset, on the category
centric, mixed data and novelty experiments. It performs best on the mixed
data experiment, but exhibits wide variability across categories.
periment. Its accuracy ranges between 64% and 87%, showing
a marked improvement over the corresponding experiment on
the cluster attack dataset. Table VII shows the per-category
TPR, FPR, FNR and accuracy results of CL-Vamos on the
mixed data experiment. The results show an improvement over
both the category centric experiment, and over the mixed data
experiment on the cluster attack dataset. Table VIII shows the
results of CL-Vamos on the novelty experiment: its accuracy
can be as high as 95%. Figure 8 summarizes the per-category
accuracy achieved by CL-Vamos in the category centric, mixed
data and novelty experiments.
Conclusion #1: The results of the novelty experiment for
the cluster and sandwich attack show that CL-Vamos can be
expected to perform quite well even if presented with videos
that belong to categories that might not have been considered
in our video motion classification.
Category dependency. We now verify the intuition that the
variation in FNR, FPR and accuracy of CL-Vamos is due
to its dependence on the video motion categories. We have
performed both Pearson’s χ2 and Fisher’s exact test on the
results of CL-Vamos for the sandwich attack dataset. The null
hypothesis is that the true positive, false positive, true negative
and false negative values are independent of the proposed
video categories. For the category centric test, the χ2’s p-value
is 0.00044 and Fisher’s p-value is 0.00013. For the mixed
data experiment, the χ2’s p-value is 0.0001166 and Fisher’s
p-value is 0.00015. For the novelty experiment, the χ2’s p-
value is 0.01771 and Fisher’s p-value is 0.00932. Thus, we
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the performance
of CL-Vamos depends on the video motion category.
Conclusion #2. While we expected that certain motion cat-
egories are easier to plagiarize, our results are surprising:
CL-Vamos does not perform worst on categories 1 and 2,
captured by a standing user with a stationary camera. Based
on observations from our experiments, we believe that CL-
Vamos exploits the ability of accelerometers to capture the
small, involuntary hand shakes that occur during video capture
sessions. Instead, CL-Vamos has high FPR values for the
sandwich attack on categories 5, 6 and 11. This shows that
in our experiments, humans are better at plagiarizing videos
shot while scanning or following subjects.
Detection of the perfect mirror attack. CL-Vamos achieved
100% accuracy when using either Random Forest, Decision
Tree or MLP on the perfect mirror attack dataset. The reason
is that the following features are consistently 0 for the fraud-
ulent chunks: the DTW normalized alignment distance, the
penalized cost, the normalized number of moves (expansion,
contraction, match), and the normalized overlap. In addition,
the calibration factor is always 1. We conclude that the
perfection of this attack is also the reason for its failure.
Detection of the (i, p, c)-mirror attack. We have run the
mixed experiment to evaluate the performance of CL-Vamos
on the (i, p, c)-mirror attack datasets of Section VI-C. Table IX
shows the per-category performance of Vamos, that ranges
between 80% and 100%.
Detection of the PFA attack. We evaluated CL-Vamos against
the PFA attack dataset in a manner different from the other
attacks. Specifically, we have run 10 different experiments.
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Category TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
1 86.96 16.67 13.04 84.91
2 94.34 6.67 5.66 93.88
3 & 7 94.0 6.93 6.0 93.53
4 73.33 4.54 26.66 86.48
5 96.65 4.76 4.35 95.45
6 100.0 0.0 0.0 100
8 73.68 0.0 26.32 88.37
9 92.6 0.0 7.4 97.02
10 90.91 15.79 9.09 87.32
11 100.0 0.0 0.0 100
12 77.78 22.22 22.22 80.0
TABLE IX
CL-VAMOS MIX EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR THE (I, P, C)-MIRROR ATTACK.
Algorithm TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
RF 91.93 2.28 8.07 94.73
MLP 90.86 2.86 9.14 93.91
DT 89.78 2.86 10.22 93.35
TABLE X
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF CL-VAMOS ON THE PFA ATTACK DATASET.
RANDOM FOREST SLIGHTLY OUTPERFORMSMLP AND DECISION TREE.
CL-VAMOS EXHIBITS HIGH ACCURACY EVEN ON THIS COMPLEX ATTACK.
In each experiment we have built a new PFA attack dataset:
pick a new random dictionary membership, and a different
set of 361 genuine and fraudulent chunks. Then, we ran 10-
fold cross validation over each dataset. Table X shows the
average results over the 10 experiments. While the Random
Forest classifier performs best, all the classifiers tested with
CL-Vamos achieved an accuracy exceeding 93%.
Conclusion #3. We have expected that the mirror attack and
variants will be very effective against CL-Vamos. Instead,
we discovered that a perfect match can be used by CL-
Vamos to trivially detect fraud. Furthermore, CL-Vamos is
effective even against mirror attack variants that introduce
controlled perturbation to the match. Based on an analysis
of the features produced by CL-Vamos, we conjecture that
an observed accelerometer “inertia” is responsible for our
success. Specifically, we observed that when the user stops
moving the device, the video motion stream records this event,
while the accelerometer continues to record unusually high
readings. Similarly, when the device begins to move, unlike
the video, the accelerometer experiences a delay in recording
the motion. The difficulty to emulate this inertia, which we
conjecture occurs throughout the motion of the device, enables
the DTW features to effectively capture differences between
genuine and fraudulent samples.
Mixed attack evaluation. We have evaluated a scenario where
CL-Vamos has knowledge of all the attacks. Specifically, we
Attack TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
Cluster 100 19.51 0 90.12
Sandwich 65.0 19.51 35.0 72.84
(p, i, c)-mirror 97.62 19.51 2.38 89.16
PFA 95.0 19.51 5.0 87.65
TABLE XI
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF CL-VAMOS ON MIX ATTACK SCENARIO,
WHERE CL-VAMOS IS TRAINED ON 90% OF ALL ATTACK INSTANCES.
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SANDWICH ATTACK, THE KNOWLEDGE OF
OTHER ATTACK INSTANCES GREATLY IMPROVES THE TPR OF CL-VAMOS.
Attack TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
Cluster 62.06 43.75 37.94 61.04
Sandwich 22.68 8.75 77.32 33.88
(i, p, c)-mirror 90.78 40.0 9.22 85.88
PFA 93.33 42.5 6.67 83.45
TABLE XII
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF CL-VAMOS ON NEW ATTACKS: CL-VAMOS
IS TESTED ON DATA FROM ATTACKS ON WHICH IT WAS NOT TRAINED. THE
SANDWICH ATTACK IS EFFECTIVE: WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF SANDWICH
ATTACK INSTANCES, CL-VAMOS PERFORMS POORLY.
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Fig. 9. Accuracy of CL-Vamos and Movee on mixed data experiment. CL-
Vamos outperforms Movee by 15%+, for both cluster and sandwich attacks.
have used all the attack datasets, for a total of 401 cluster,
401 sandwich, 401 (i, p, c)-mirror and 10 × 180 PFA attack
instances. We have trained CL-Vamos on 90% of each of the
attack datasets, as well as 90% of the 401 genuine instances.
We have then tested CL-Vamos separately on the remaining
10% of attack instance of each attack, along with 90% of the
genuine instances. To compensate for the 7 hold imbalance
in the number of fraudulent vs. genuine instances, we have
assigned a penalty during training for incorrectly classifying
fraudulent (1/8)) and genuine instances (7/8).
Table XI shows that with the exception of the sandwich
attack, the knowledge of other attack instances greatly im-
proves the TPR of CL-Vamos. The FPR increase is due to
the imbalance between the number of fraudulent and genuine
instances used during training.
Resilience to new attacks. To investigate the ability of CL-
Vamos to detect new, previously unseen attacks, we have
performed the following experiment. For each attack type a
we considered (cluster, sandwich, mirror variants), we trained
CL-Vamos using all the fraudulent instances from all the attack
datasets except a, as well as 80% of all the genuine chunks. We
have then tested CL-Vamos on all the instances of the attack
dataset of type a, and the remaining 20% genuine chunks.
Table XII shows the results. As expected, the performance
of CL-Vamos degrades on all the attacks. In particular, for the
sandwich attack, CL-Vamos achieves an overall accuracy of
33.88%. This result confirms the strength of the sandwich at-
tack: in the absence of any sandwich attack training instances,
CL-Vamos incorrectly accepts as genuine, more than 3 out of
4 fraudulent, sandwich chunks.
D. CL-Vamos vs. Movee
We have compared the performance of CL-Vamos and
Movee using the mixed data experiment, on the cluster and
sandwich attack datasets. Figure 9 summarizes our results. On
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the cluster attack, CL-Vamos achieves 88% accuracy when
using MLP (Random Forest 83%, Bagging 81%, Decision
Trees 78% and SVM 80%). Movee achieves highest accuracy
when using the Random Forest (73%). On the sandwich attack,
CL-Vamos achieves 85% accuracy when using Random Forest
(MLP 71%, Bagging 78%, Decision Trees 74% and SVM
80%). Movee achieves the highest, 67% accuracy, when using
either Random Forest or Bagging classifiers. This substantial
improvement of CL-Vamos corresponds to an FNR of 6-14%
and FPR of 15-17% on these attacks. In contrast, Movee’s
FNR is between 21-28% and FPR is between 31-38%.
E. CL-Vamos on Citizen Journalism
Current YouTube videos do not have acceleration data. CL-
Vamos however only works for video chunks for which we
have acceleration data. We propose to use the classification
of the collected YouTube videos (see Section VII-A) and
the performance of CL-Vamos on the free-form video and
acceleration samples (see Section VII-C) to predict its per-
formance on fixed length chunks of citizen journalism videos
from YouTube.
Let Acc(i, F reeForm,AT ) denote the accuracy of CL-
Vamos on videos from the i-th category (i=1..11) of the
free-form dataset, for a given attack type AT. We define the
predicted accuracy of CL-Vamos for YouTube and the attack
type AT, Accp(Y ouTube,AT ), as the weighted sum of its
per-category accuracy on the free-form dataset:
Accp(Y ouTube,AT ) =
∑11
i=1 wi × Acc(i, F reeForm,AT ).
We define the weight wi to be the percentage of chunks of
category i in the YouTube dataset, as shown in Figure 6(a).
In the YouTube dataset categories 1 and 2 have the highest
weight. The predicted accuracy of CL-Vamos for the cluster
attack on the YouTube dataset is then 80.9%, and for the
sandwich attack is 77.19%.
F. Vamos Evaluation
We now evaluate the performance of Vamos on entire video
and acceleration samples. We note that a sample can consist
of multiple chunks that belong to different motion categories.
We have performed experiments using the stitch attack datasets
(based on chunk-level cluster and sandwich attacks) described
in Section VI-C. The stitch attack datasets consist of both
genuine and fraudulent free-form samples.
Vamos makes the sample level classification decision based
on the classification of the chunks of the sample. In order to
avoid a case where the same chunk appears in both training
and testing sets, we propose the following experimental design,
illustrated in Figure 10.
First, divide the dataset of 113 samples of at least 2 chunks
each, into k folds, gen.fold(i), i = 1..k, and the correspond-
ing 339 attack sample dataset (either cluster or sandwich attack
based) into k folds, attack.fold(i), i = 1..k. The split takes
place such that the samples from the gen.fold(i) were used
to generate the attack samples from attack.fold(i). Then, for
each i = 1..k, pick all the samples from gen.fold(j) and
attack.fold(j), j = 1..k, j 6= i, and use their chunks to train
CL-Vamos. Run the trained CL-Vamos on all the chunks from
gen.fold(i) and attack.fold(i). Given the classified chunks
Fig. 10. Setup of Vamos experiment. Each genuine fold produces a stitch
attack fold. In each experiment, 9 genuine folds and the corresponding stitch
attack folds are used for training. The rest are used for testing.
Algo Thr TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
Maj.
Vote
0.1 91.69 7.95 8.31 91.78
0.3 84.09 4.39 15.91 86.97
0.5 34.80 0.00 65.20 51.10
0.7 24.49 0.00 75.51 43.37
Prob
0.6 92.55 26.21 7.45 87.86
0.7 91.69 7.95 8.31 91.78
0.8 61.39 5.38 38.61 69.70
Bagging 97.35 5.08 2.65 95.53
TABLE XIII
VAMOS EFFICACY ON CLUSTER BASED STITCH ATTACK. THE SUPERVISED
LEARNING APPROACH PERFORMS BEST.
of the samples from gen.fold(i) and from attack.fold(i), run
the sample level classification step to classify the samples.
For instance, to compute Pr(S = fake) for a sample S,
compute Pr(ai = genuine) and Pr(ai = fake) based on
the number of fake and genuine chunks in the training folds
(see Section V). In our experiments, we set k to 10.
Experiment results. Table XIII reports the performance of
Vamos on the cluster based stitch attack dataset. We have
experimented with multiple threshold values. For majority
voting, a threshold of 0.1 performed best: both FPR and
FNR values are under 9%. For the probabilistic approach,
a threshold of 0.7 achieves similar performance. However,
we note that the classifier approach, when using the Bagging
algorithm, significantly outperforms the other solutions, with
an FPR of around 5% and an FNR of 2.65%.
Algo Thr TPR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) Acc(%)
Maj.
Vote
0.1 85.10 41.29 14.90 78.50
0.3 76.23 40.76 23.77 71.97
0.5 34.93 13.56 65.07 47.76
0.7 25.55 8.11 74.45 42.08
Prob
0.6 93.76 75.53 6.24 76.44
0.7 91.67 70.08 8.33 74.64
0.8 66.46 34.92 33.54 66.12
Bagging 83.7 3.63 16.3 93.199
TABLE XIV
VAMOS PERFORMANCE ON SANDWICH/STITCH ATTACK. NEITHER OF THE
MAJORITY VOTING AND THE PROBABILISTIC APPROACHES
SIMULTANEOUSLY ACHIEVES SMALL FPR AND FNR VALUES. THE
SUPERVISED LEARNING APPROACH SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES BOTH THE
FPR AND FNR VALUES.
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Fig. 11. Vamos accuracy on stitch attacks. Even for the sandwich stitch attack,
the classifier approach (using Bagging) exceeds 93% accuracy.
Table XIV shows the performance of the majority voting,
probabilistic and classifier based approaches of Vamos, on
the sandwich based stitch attack dataset. For majority voting
and probabilistic approaches, the sandwich based stitch attack
is significantly more efficient: The majority voting has no
threshold where both FPR and FNR are below 35%. The
probabilistic approach achieves its optimum for a threshold
of 0.8, when its FPR and FNR values are barely under 35%.
In contrast, the classifier approach, again when using Bagging,
exhibits a significantly improved performance, with an FPR of
under 4% and an FNR of 16.3%. Figure 11 summarizes the
accuracy of the three approaches of Vamos for the cluster and
sandwich based stitching attacks.
VIII. LIMITATIONS
Vamos needs to have access to inertial sensor data captured
simultaneously with the video. The clients of most live stream-
ing apps do not currently upload this data. Vamos can however
be easily integrated with other solutions, e.g., FOCUS [35],
that use simultaneously captured sensor data to automatically
cluster mobile videos uploaded by users (see Section II).
Vamos could benefit from the use of additional sensors,
e.g., the gyroscope. The ability to verify the consistency of
the motion extracted from video, accelerometer and gyroscope
reading streams would likely make it more difficult for an
attacker to successfully launch the attacks that we proposed.
We note however that Vamos achieves good accuracy even
when leveraging only the accelerometer.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed Vamos, the first length and motion un-
constrained video liveness verification system. Vamos uses
the entire video and acceleration streams to identify video
fraud. We proposed a suite of novel, manual and automatic
attacks that target acceleration based video liveness analysis
solutions. Our evaluation, on data collected from a user study
and on citizen journalism videos from YouTube, shows that
Vamos accurately detects even complex attacks. In addition,
we have introduced a motion based classification of videos,
and have shown that the accuracy of Vamos depends on the
video category.
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